Le Canada fait face à des problèmes environnementaux qui menacent notre stock de capital naturell'eau, les forêts, les terres et l'atmosphère -et le flux de biens et services que génère ce capital naturel, c'est-à-dire les services écosystémiques. Dans ce domaine, la littérature traite surtout des changements climatiques et des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, alors que l'on doit relever plusieurs autres défis, dont la pollution de l'eau et de l'air, les risques que pose l'extraction de pétrole et de gaz, la pénurie d'eau, les inondations, la perte d'espaces naturels, la menace qui pèse sur plusieurs espèces et les conséquences des déversements de produits toxiques. S'il existe des mesures réglementaires, leur efficacité est contestable, étant donné le nombre limité d'instruments axés sur le marché. Dans cet article, nous nous concentrons sur les défis liés à la mise en place et à l'évaluation de politiques visant à soutenir le capital naturel et les services écosystémiques. Nous mettons certains problèmes en lumière et nous définissons les options politiques et les « grandes idées » qui peuvent nous aider à mieux comprendre les relations qui existent entre le capital naturel, les services écosystémiques et le bien-être de la population, ainsi qu'à construire un avenir plus durable.
Introduction
Canada faces environmental problems that threaten our stock of natural capital-our endowment of natural resources such as water, forests, land, and atmosphereand the flow of goods and services that natural capital generates, known as ecosystem services. These services are under threat from multiple ''market failures'' such as greenhouse gas emissions; air, water, and land pollution; toxic spills of chemicals and petrochemicals; and loss of natural areas to urbanization and resource development. Regulatory responses exist in the form of guidelines and standards as well as processes such as environmental assessment and reviews of energy projects, but Canadian governments have made relatively little use of market-based instruments. After a brief review of the challenges associated with measuring and developing policy to sustain natural capital and ecosystem services, we offer six policy options that make use of prices to help in the battle to protect Canada's natural capital.
Why Do Market Failures Persist?
A market economy handles billions of transactions every day. Its ability to do this efficiently and effectively is based on several conditions, including prices that signal scarcity, symmetric information held by both buyers and sellers (no opportunity for selling ''lemons''), and security of property rights (I get control over what I pay for). Stable government and legal systems help ensure property rights. When these conditions do not hold for forms of natural capital and the ecosystem services flowing from natural capital, negative externalities (e.g., pollution) arise with private-sector decision-making that does not take into account negative impacts on natural-capital stocks and flows.
In cases where the market does not work, we need to rely on government policies to help internalize externalities and build impacts on ecosystem services into development decisions. Governments have many tools at their disposal, but in Canada we have depended primarily on what economists call ''command and control'' policies: technology and performance guidelines and standards (e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Objectives and Standards), environmental reviews of intra-and inter-provincial development projects (e.g., pipelines), subsidies to encourage activities that protect natural capital (e.g., eco-gift donations of natural areas to conservation groups), and protection of natural areas (e.g., provincial and national parks, wilderness areas). These policies are definitely part of our policy portfolio to sustain natural capital, but studies by researchers ranging from government agencies to academics and NGOs say we are not doing enough. 1 Federally, Canada had, in recent years, been moving in directions that offer less protection to natural capital. Examples include the weakening of federal environmental regulations including the Fisheries Act and the Environmental Assessment Act. This leads to weaker rights to protect the natural environment and the potential for outcomes such as rapid natural-resource developments that generate GHGs and air contaminants and are not required to sustain water quantity and quality or fully take into account adverse impacts on ecosystems. Changes in federal environmental regulations also produce uncertainty about provinces' ability to assess environmental impacts and citizens' rights to object to development. Canada's Supreme Court affirmed First Nations' property rights to natural resources in their traditional territories, but what policy framework will be needed to protect these rights?
Property rights, prices, and information are vital to running any market. Without them, we risk making decisions that will have negative impacts on our ecosystems and quality of life for decades to come. Commenting on the global financial crisis, Denning (2011) notes, ''The drive for short-term profit crushed all opposition in its path, until the inevitable meltdown in 2008. People did speak out and try to blow the whistle on what was going on. They were ignored or sidelined in the rush for the money.'' The environmental and scientific communities have been raising warning signs for years about climate change, loss of natural areas, loss of species, and pollution, with insufficient policy responses to these problems. Using prices and markets to signal the scarcity of ecosystem services can help address these challenges and place non-market ecosystem services on a ''level playing field'' with marketed goods and services.
Natural Capital, Wealth Accounting, and Ecosystem Services
The environmental economics literature has a long history of bringing the concept of natural capital into mainstream economic analysis and policy. The early literature advanced ideas of how natural capital should be incorporated into economic analysis of sustainability and how changes over time are used as a measure of sustainable economies. Indicators of sustainability using natural capital concepts include the Genuine Savings measure (Hamilton and Clemens 1999) and the Inclusive Wealth Index (UNU-IHDP and UNEP 2012). Often these indicators are developed at national scales and outline whether economies are developing along sustainable paths-as indicated by some form of net appreciation in wealth, which in turn is decomposed into components of capital that lead to changes in wealth. The indicators often show that overall wealth is increasing for most of the world at the expense of natural capital, giving the appearance that countries are on sustainable paths. 2 While these indicators help us to understand growth processes, and while significant progress has been made in solidifying their conceptual foundations and empirical measurement, significant challenges remain. The prices or values used in these analyses to measure the values of natural capital (or produced/physical capital) may be distorted because of subsidies (e.g., for oil and gas development, ethanol) or other imperfections (e.g., imperfect competition, natural monopoly); this is one reason that ''getting prices right'' is important. To accurately measure natural-capital stocks and ecosystemservice flows, the non-market or unpriced elements need to be included; currently the measures of natural capital focus on marketed ecosystem services (timber, minerals, etc.) . The people trying to estimate our natural wealth are well aware of the need to get prices right, but they face a lack of data on ecosystem goods and services and on the capacity to do the measurements (budgets and the human-capital expertise). How can we ensure that the needed data are generated?
The literature on ecosystem services attempts to identify the link between changes in natural capital, ecosystems, services accruing to people, and the value of such changes and then connects these changes back to policy institutions, decision-making frameworks, and the behaviour of consumers and producers to assess the impact on human well-being. This research area has many challenges: the measurement of ecosystem-economy linkages, the costs and benefits of outcomes, and the design of policies to address adverse outcomes. But it sheds light on a few potential areas where strides can be made to improve the process and contribute to sustainable prosperity-a system that is responsive to new information, that designs policy options best suited to addressing the problems, and that results in the generation of data that lead to a better understanding of economic and environmental conditions.
Information on Ecosystem Services as Core to Effective Environmental Policy Design
Little information exists on the economic benefits (or value) of changes in the levels of key non-market ecosystem services. The cost of achieving environmental goals is hard to measure, often overstated (''job-killing carbon taxes'') and not revealed in the policy process. Public-policy decisions such as where to locate a pipeline or condo development often have limited information about ecosystem impacts, and some of the information may be known only to the promoter of the development and not revealed to the public or to decision-makers (e.g., the lack of a thorough environmental assessment and spill-mitigation plan in the National Energy Board hearings on the Enbridge pipeline proposal). The result is that policy frameworks are not well informed about the benefits or costs of policy options that affect natural capital. Citizens have few channels through which to express clear preferences for policies and outcomes. Adding risk and uncertainty about the connections between economic activity and the effects on the natural environment further increases the complexity, as does policy inertia. An example is wetlands conservation: for decades we have drained wetlands without understanding the beneficial role they play in storing and cleansing water, and providing habitat for species and storage for greenhouse gases.
Is there a ''success story'' that we can learn from? Public policy associated with air quality, especially in the United States, has made substantial strides in the past few decades. There is a direct and well-documented linkage between changes in the natural-capital base (air quality) and changes in human health and labour productivity (see Graff Zivin and Neidell 2013). There have also been significant strides in the measurement of the value of mortality risk reduction-the largest component of benefits from air quality improvement. Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) argue that there is sufficient information on the linkage between changes in policy (e.g., the sulphur dioxide cap-and-trade system in the United States), changes in the behaviour of firms, and changes in ecosystem services (air quality and mortality risk reduction) to develop efficient spatially explicit policies and to assess the impact of pollution in a national accounting framework.
This case illustrates that strong linkage between air quality and human health probably led to the investment in research and monitoring that generated the data necessary to understand these ''dose-response'' relationships. The valuation focused on mortality risk reduction, something that could be measured in many studies, and thus allowed for replication that increased confidence in the estimates. The heterogeneity in costs across emitters meant that tradable-emissions schemes could be employed to achieve cost savings-regulatory innovation that built upon a strong existing institutional framework. 3 We also learned that there is substantial heterogeneity across firms in terms of their contributions to environmental damages. Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus (2011) show that several key sectors generate pollution damages that exceed their value added, while others generate relatively little damage in comparison to their value added. In those sectors where damages exceed value added the pollution level allowed is too high: the additional costs of pollution are greater than the additional benefit of a unit of production. Measuring the monetary value of pollution damages helps indicate which sectors require additional regulatory attention. There can be a trade-off between the economy and the environment, but it is highly variable across sectors. Unless these impacts are addressed, the damages reflect an implicit subsidy from the afflicted parties to the generating parties. A parallel is the challenges facing the renewable energy sector, because the subsidy associated with unaccounted damages from fossil-fuel combustion is not addressed.
We offer some additional factors contributing to the lack of policy response to losses of ecosystem services:
e Lack of evidence and data. While Statistics Canada and other agencies are in the process of creating baselines and ongoing measures of Canada's natural capital and associated ecosystem services, as noted above the data are not comprehensive.
We lack an integrated federal/provincial system of accounting. Without sufficient baseline data, measurement of ecosystem-service losses (in physical and economic value) is challenging, if not impossible. Compounding this is the lack of information on the costs of actions (and benefits) to address adverse effects, and insufficient knowledge about the risks associated with environmental impacts. e Public and political perception. Given the paucity of data, the public and its decision-makers may feel that the impacts of losses in ecosystem services is not large enough to warrant action, or that any actions taken come at the expense of jobs and economic growth. The ''jobs versus the environment'' dichotomy is viewed as a barrier to policy action. The complexity of the ecosystem is no doubt a confounding issue; science can never show with absolute certainty the impacts of our actions on our stocks and flows of natural capital. Relatively short terms in elected office do not help in making decisions that have long-term consequences. e Public goods and behavioural norms. Much of Canada's natural capital is a public good, is owned by the Crown or is an open-access resource such as the atmosphere. Everyone may agree that it is good to sustain our ecosystem services, but no one wants to pay for doing so (or wants someone else to pay). This problem is particularly acute in our federal system, where multiple levels of government must deal with public-good provision and don't always have the tools to fully incorporate consideration of natural-capital impacts. For example, municipal governments are responsible for land-use planning in their jurisdictions, supplying potable water, and waste management. However, they have far fewer tools to price the natural capital in their jurisdiction than do provincial or federal governments, due to limited taxation and regulatory powers.
Six Ideas to Move from Policy Inertia to Policy Action
1. Measure natural capital to the extent possiblebut don't stop with those components that are easily measureable. As mentioned above, most current measures of natural capital use marketbased goods in the calculation. We need to support government and non-governmental organizations' efforts to provide the baselines for natural-capital data and the continued estimation of non-market ecosystem flows over time from natural capital. For example, some effort has been put into measuring carbon stock changes, and using the social cost of carbon, measures of natural capital have been extended to include carbon. Similarly, there are efforts to quantify changes in agricultural land quantity and quality, and the market and nonmarket ecosystem services arising from agricultural land that can be incorporated into natural capital accounts (Haarsma and Qiu 2015; Haarsma et al. 2014) . Elements of natural capital that are easier to measure (e.g., forest inventory and harvests) need to be augmented with the tough stuff like non-market ecosystem services from the forest. A national body that has a sufficient budget to coordinate and collate the efforts going on from the local to the national level could help. 2. Generate incentives, information, and data using decentralized / disruptive instruments. We offer three suggestions to improve data provision, assess the benefits and costs of improved ecosystem-service provision, and assess the performance of mechanisms designed to conserve ecosystems services. e Link fines, fees, and liability to actual damages. (Muehlenbachs 2015 ). An option is to modify performance bonds to incorporate losses of ecosystem services as well as funds to reclaim landscapes. White et al. (2012) describe an optimal mechanism for mine reclamation / restoration policy as a combination of an environmental bond and a ''damaged land tax.'' The latter provides an incentive to reduce interim losses in ecosystem services, while the former focuses on maintaining sufficient funds to reclaim the site in cases of insolvency. This approach, by estimating impacts, would generate information of the value of ecosystem service losses. 3. Implement policy pilots-with evaluation frameworks that yield ecosystem services prices-for cases where it is clear that benefits exceed the costs of conservation. Forms of offset markets can be used that require ''no net loss'' in ecosystem services to price ecosystem services. A developer or agent changing land use must either avoid affecting the habitat in question or offset any impacts with an equivalent creation of habitat elsewhere. This has been particularly effective in the United States to protect wetlands or the biodiversity of threatened species habitats. Learning by doing in these cases, and formal program evaluation, will be important for industry and for policy-makers and will reveal much-needed information on the costs of improvements in ecosystem-service provision. Discussions around the use of conservation offsets in Canada have been increasing (see, e.g., Poulton 2014). Local conservation offset pilots have helped identify how to assess the equivalence of the offset created and how to obtain offsets from third parties, but more attention needs to be paid to the costs of providing the ecosystem services. Offset market design should also consider economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness aspects (Kinzig et al. 2011) . Creativity in offset market design is found in experiments with ''reverse auctions'' to identify landowners who are willing to participate in such programs (Hill et al., 2011 ; see also the Alberta Land Institute reverse auction program 4 ) and ''revolving land purchases'' (buying land, putting an easement on it, and reselling it) being employed by Ducks Unlimited Canada in an attempt to expand the potential market of offset suppliers (see Noga and Adamowicz 2014) . But several open research questions remain. Participation rates by landowners in conservation auctions have been low, perhaps because these are new instruments on the Canadian landscape, but also potentially because of social norms, inertia (default effects), or other ''behavioural'' aspects. A comparison or evaluation of the efficacy of in-lieu fee systems, offset programs, and credit-exchange systems is necessary. Finally, the challenge of developing conservation offset programs on public land, where there may be multiple competing (overlapping) tenures for resource access, remains a research issue (Seiferling 2015) 4. Employ innovative environmental tax programs.
While conservation offsets use a restriction on quantity (e.g., no net loss of habitat), other forms of market-based instruments can be used to directly impose a price for the use of ecosystem services.
These tax-based instruments may lead to investments in innovation and productivity improvements. We highlight three approaches: e Environmental taxes with revenues flowing to a dedicated fund. The fund can be used to support research and technologies that enhance ecosystem services and protect natural capital. e Revenue-neutral environmental taxes. British Columbia's carbon tax is designed to be revenue neutral, with proceeds dedicated to offset income taxes and cushion impacts on low-income and rural individuals. The program has been shown to be effective in reducing emissions (Elgie and McClay 2013) . Recent literature highlights the importance of targeting the damaging components directly and using the proceeds to reduce other taxes (Heine, Norregaard, and Parry 2012) . e Tax-refund Schemes. These schemes place a relatively high tax on the ecosystem service being affected but then return the revenues from the tax to the parties (industries), who pay it according to a performance-based formula. The most successful of these cases, in terms of emissions reduction, is the Swedish nitrogen oxides tax, which returned tax revenue to emitters on the basis of their industrial output. Such a mechanism could be used for ecosystem services, including water resources. 5. Change perspectives: implement creative policy mixes (e.g., cross-compliance schemes, mixed regulatory and market-based methods). Economists and policy-makers have focused on the substitution of one policy approach for another (e.g., command and control versus market-based instruments). In reality, policies are layered or mixed as there is reluctance to relax existing policy frameworks for (2013) found that agricultural riskmanagement programs (e.g. crop insurance) increase the costs of generating non-market ecosystem services from land such as wetland restoration. A cross-compliance program, requiring that certain environmental objectives be met before farms receive benefits from government-supported risk-management programs, would help offset these increased costs of ecosystem-service provision. 6. Improve methods for communicating preferences and generating funding for natural-capital and ecosystem services. With few markets for ecosystem services, there is a lack of information on the economic value of ecosystem services programs. Furthermore, there are few channels through which citizens can signal their support (or lack thereof ) for natural-capital and ecosystem-services programs. However, two avenues for improved assessment of public values for ecosystem services are local referenda and crowdsourcing:
e Referenda. Referenda on funding for local ecosystem-service-provision projects can provide a mechanism for the communication of preference for environmental improvements. For example, referenda may be structured to increase propertytax assessments and direct the funding to ecosystem-service provision. One jurisdiction has constructed a guide for communities interested in using referenda to fund conservation projects (South Okanagan-Similkameen Conservation Program 2011). Funding for local public goods using bond issues is common in US states. Banzhaf, Oates, and Sanchirico (2010) describe the successes and challenges that US conservation organizations have experienced in mobilizing public support for such projects. Ando and Shah (2016) review the literature on conservation finance and provide a set of key research questions. e Crowdsourcing / Crowdfunding. Several agencies are exploring the use of crowdsourcing as a mechanism for communicating environmental preferences and funding ecosystem-service provision. For example, a recent Credit Suisse / WWF / McKinsey report on conservation finance includes crowdfunding as a way to broaden the set of investors in conservation programs to include the general public (WWF 2014). While novel, crowdsourcing is not without its challenges, including the rapidly increasing competition in this area.
Can We Change Things?
We offer our policy ideas as steps toward meeting the challenges we articulated by making natural-capital data more visible and comprehensive, thereby demonstrating the cogency of ecosystem services to people's lives; by setting prices for these services; and by assigning responsibility with financial consequences to those who adversely affect natural capital. It will be a challenge to move from our inadequate current system to one where policy helps incorporate natural capital and ecosystem services into economic decisions, but the sooner some of these initiatives proceed, the more likely we are to have sustainable prosperity. We end with the words of Barry Ritholtz (2011) 
